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Abstract. This paper is a comparison between two works usually 
ascribed to the utopian genre: Thomas More’s Utopia, and Francis Bacon’s 
New Atlantis. My major claim is that the two differ mainly in this respect: if 
More’s work is utopian, Bacon’s New Atlantis is only disguised under the 
clothing  of  utopian  thought.  Although  Bacon  has  clearly  an  ideal  of 
education in mind, through a number of features he completely departs 
from utopian educational programs.  
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Introduction 
In this paper I am going to show that Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis is not a 
specimen of the utopian genre. In order to do this I will compare the Baconian text 
to Thomas More’s Utopia, a token of the genre. In consequence, the present paper 
will suggest that Francis Bacon has opted for a fictional wrapping to bring forward a 
thoroughly  attainable  project,  later  to  be  implemented  by  the  Royal  Society.  A 
comparison of Bacon’s text with More’s Utopia might be a good strategy to boost 
the view that New Atlantis has only little in common - like the broad scope of 
reform, for instance - with the utopian genre that More has brought to life.  
If we judge by appearances, Utopia and New Atlantis seem very alike: two 
writings  carved  out  of  travel  literature,  using  voyage  as  an  introduction  to  a 
depiction of the perfect commonwealth. Yet, an analysis of their content and their 
symbolism  discourages  such  a  view  and  convinces  the  reader  of  the  different 
messages the two writings transmit. The following pages will be dedicated to the 
decryption of these messages and their implication in relation to the utopian genre. 
The present paper does not intend to clarify what has troubled scholars for decades 
- the exact intentions of the writers and their own view of what their papers should 
determine in their readers1 - but represents instead only a comparison.  
A hundred years after Thomas More ushers in the new literary genre of 
Utopia, Francis Bacon writes his New Atlantis. In the text, Bacon seems to combine 
the genres of scientific treatise and utopia alongside a renaissance tradition of mixed 
models.2  This  writing  style  was  later  on  followed  by  Margaret  Cavendish.3  She 
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decided to respond to Hooke’s Micrographia, by writing a work similar in style to 
Bacon’s more scientific oriented approach. New Atlantis was as a model for the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century European Academies, as the formal histories of 
the learned societies and their charters attest.4 Of all the early attempts to build a 
self-conscious group of natural philosophers of a Baconian type, the Royal Society 
seemed to fit best into the description of the ideal scientific society that Bacon 
described in the New Atlantis. But if this is the case, his utopian writing would seem 
less utopian than expected as the Royal Society’s progressive scientific knowledge 
does not fit into the definition of utopia at all. Also, compared with the ironic 
account  of  Morean  perfect-thought  society,  Francis  Bacon’s  ambitions  of 
reformation  seem  not  just  significantly  modest  but  also  deeply  rooted  into  a 
particular account of human nature. And these are exactly the essential elements that 
this comparison will insist upon in an attempt to underline the distinctive features of 
the texts proposed.  
My  argument  will  use  larger  or  smaller  fragments of  the  texts  which, I 
believe,  could  clarify  the  structural  differences  between  the  two  works.  Bacon’s 
work  has  both  an  open  ending  whereas  More’s  Utopia  is  finished.  Moreover, 
whereas  More’s  work  presents  a  detailed  description  of  a  social  organization, 
Bacon’s text focuses less on the politics of the society and more on a particular 
aspect  of  the  societal  organization,  the  scientific  community.  It  must  also  be 
mentioned that, since New Atlantis was unfinished, there have been some attempts 
to continue it. This observation is highly significant since the abrupt, unfinished 
ending  of  the  book  might  be  a  sign  of  the  author’s  intention.  However,  even 
without presumptions regarding Bacon’s aims, the lack of ending or continuation 
focuses the attention of the reader on the actual text that Bacon has left and on 
what of it is indeed significant for the scope of the work. I think that even if Bacon 
may have intended to complete the work by describing a perfect Commonwealth 
like William Rawley suggested, it remains doubtful whether Bacon followed this 
strain  of  thought  to  its  end  and  was  instead  averted  by  lack  of  time  from  its 
fulfillment.  Rather,  he  may  have  focused  on  the  central  figure  in  his  work  - 
Solomon’s House - as scientific practice devoid of political color, possible to be 
pursued in any sort of political setting – as pointed out by David Colclough.5  
The contradiction between Utopia and the attainability of Bacon’s proposed 
project will often recur in the text. It is important therefore to explain that, Utopia is 
considered to be a systematic solution to man’s misfortune - Utopus is extremely 
well characterized by Davis primarily as a system builder6 - embodied in thorough 
change  of  tradition,  customs  and  societal  structure.  Bacon’s  plan  of  reforming 
knowledge is centered on a systematization of knowledge and only secondarily leads 
to  a  reformation  of  societal  habits.  That’s  why  Bacon’s  scientific  society  model 
presented  in  the  New  Atlantis  appears  susceptible  to  utopian  interpretation,7 
perspective that this paper attempts to challenge.   
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This essay will try, first, to delimit - without aiming at a rigid definition - the 
fundamental  particularities  of  the  fictional  writing,  grounding  its  assortment  of 
characteristics in Davis’s account of utopianism,8 Goodwin and Taylor’s definition9 
of  the  genre,  as  appertaining  to  the field  of  political  thought  and  to  the  broad 
analysis of Frank E. and Frietzie P. Manuel.10  
 
What is a Utopia? Its Morean legacy 
According to Quentin Skinner, what Thomas More had done in the early 
1520s was to deal with a standard subject of debate in the Renaissance era: the 
question  regarding  the  elements  that  constitute  the  best  state  of  the 
commonwealth.11 Comparing More’s work to the literary genres of the educational 
treatises  developed  by  the  heirs  of  the  quattrocento  humanists,  the  mirror-for-
princes genre and advice books to which the work of More is deeply connected as 
Skinner12  and  Davis13  highlight,  Utopia  is  concerned  not  only  with  the  way  the 
leaders of the society should exercise a virtuous government upon their subjects, 
but, moreover, with the way the commonwealth could be generally reformed. What 
is indeed significant about the work Utopia, as an expression of utopianism, is that it 
challenges the Christian humanists’ project of reform from within. Moral renewal 
solely is simply not enough a cure to transform a corrupt society into a virtuous one. 
That is why, building on the renaissance exercise of fusing scholastic and humanist 
quests for an institutional context of virtue, the utopia - embodied in More’s work - 
reveals the appropriate institutions which manage to correctly impose virtue upon 
the  people.  Thus,  the  problem  of  social  morality  becomes  the  central  issue  of 
utopianism.14 This, however, is not the case in Bacon’s New Atlantis. Bacon’s science 
undermines utopia, as I will try to demonstrate in the second part of the paper, 
which I dedicate to Bacon’s vision of reform. 
There is no dissension as to whether More has been influenced by Plato’s 
political philosophy and his view on the perfect commonwealth, the philosopher’s 
city. Nevertheless, More’s Utopus - the good king who built the city - manages to 
govern  it  justly  without  any  help  from  abstract  philosophy.15  Moreover,  More 
distances  himself  from  Plato,  both  in  the  first  and  the  second  Book  of  Utopia, 
through the instauration of complete equality of property and the setting up of an 
intricate hierarchy of pleasures which, according to the Manuels, offer insight into 
the Christian humanism that might have influenced More.16 
According  to  Barbara  Goodwin  and  Keith  Taylor,17  his  description 
includes, as a form of political theory, several devices, like perfect justice and ideal 
liberty that construct this new form of representing political thought. These devices 
work like the invocation of an ideal, which serves to transcend present reality and 
point to a possible better future, evaluating present imperfections in the light of that 
ideal.  The  methodological  problems  that  arise  when  trying  to  compare  absolute 
ideas with present reality are solved in the writing of More by 
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. . . the imaginary of a creation of a constructive Utopia . . . which supplies 
an alternative model of society in which numerous ideas are simultaneously 
and harmoniously realized and from which can be derived principles of 
evaluation detached from present reality, by which present institutions can 
be judged.18  
 
More’s Utopia can be, therefore, placed into the genre of utopias, as selected 
and  organized  by  Goodwin  and  Taylor,  because  it  resembles  a  set  of  fictional 
writings that offer constructive criticism of the present via an ideal alternative.  
Next, on the basis of the elements highlighted above, I will limit myself for 
the moment to tracing a broad description of what has been called a utopian writing. 
In the same volume, Goodwin and Taylor hint on an ample definition of utopia 
which sums up all the characteristics already mentioned, and which: 
 
 denote an elaborate vision of the good life in a perfect society which is 
viewed as an integrated totality: such a vision transcends normal idealism 
and is inevitably at variance with the imperfections of existing society and 
so, per se, constitutes a critique of social institutions.19 
 
 How do Utopia and New Atlantis fit into this general description and what 
do they have to say about the characteristics of a utopian writing? 
     
One work - several wrappings 
After being published for the first time in Latin in Louvain (1516), several 
other Latin editions20 followed which, in comparison with the vernacular versions 
can be considered “more conservative and stable.” They preserve fragments of the 
original  paratextual  apparatus,  without  lacking  titles,  authorizations  and  marginal 
notes. In the context of the political and religious upheavals in Europe, at times, 
editors,  concerned  with  gratifying  political  or  clerical  authorities,  were  adapting 
More’s representations of his ‘personality’ to fit the political and religious beliefs. As 
such, More was portrayed as a catholic martyr, at times “England’s distinguished 
jewel,”21 sometimes wearing just the title he had when he wrote Utopia22 or only “a 
simple citizen of London.” Even more, once Utopia started appearing in vernacular, 
its protean character facilitated the adaptation of the text to the aim of the edition. 
“In the vernacular versions of Utopia . . . the name More and the cluster of features 
attached to it have above all the function of sign advertising the character of the 
book.”23 And Utopia not only managed to adopt to different contexts (Terence Cave 
successfully managed to bring together for analysis all substantive paratexts of the 
extant translations of Utopia printed between 1524 and 1643) but More has been 
constantly invoked ever since by most political thinkers trying to make their point.  
In the following part of my paper, my aim is to show, disregarding the 
author’s position in relation to the text, that More’s Utopia, with its aim of perfect  
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totality and systematic renewal from above, fits the utopian paradigm. I think that 
one could only suggest and not definitely decode More’s intentions, while Bacon’s 
New Atlantis - treated in the second section - offers more room for interpreting what 
the author’s intentions might have been.  
In the following passages, I will show that More’s ideal commonwealth 
works  according  to  properly  enforced  laws  and  envisages  a  particular  sort  of 
outward educational process which appeals to the rationality of the human nature 
and rests on a particular account of sin. I will take into consideration fragments of 
More’s text that highlight the important role of the institutions in charge of the 
inculcation of precise values and the need of control to be carried out by them to 
assure order and harmony. I will show at the end of this discussion that Utopia is an 
ideal state in the sense that its civil laws are perfect and that they are considered to 
be so for their successful assailing of the human vices as long as they are constantly 
inflicted on the citizens.  
 
Reform from above: an external appeal to rationality   
Thomas More draws attention in his book to the two characteristics of 
utopian writing highlighted above. First we have the critique to an existing state of 
affairs in Book One of his work – Hythloday, the "nonsense-speaker,” an explorer 
of political forms and ideas, rather than of places. The critique stresses the biases of 
the English judicial system. Second, a counterexample is given to us in Book II, a 
better society where the evils of the former disappear. More’s construction, as we 
shall see, presents all the features of outlined definition.  
   The cause of all injustice in More’s England is identified in the first Book. 
Hythloday, “a man of quite advanced years, with a sunburned face, a long beard and 
a  cloak  hanging  loosely  from  his  shoulders”  who  had  traveled  with  Amerigo 
Vespucci and a wise knower of various countries and people, states his opinion on 
the usefulness of wise counselors in a king’s council and expresses his position 
toward the unexpected growth of criminality in England. The problem of ensuring 
the fact that kings receive appropriate advice from their counselors24 is a common 
topic  of  humanist  literature.  In  addition,  the  clash  of  two  distinct  Renaissance 
perspectives  on  the  role  of  the  scholar  in  a  well-governed  commonwealth  is 
introduced. Thus, the view of the philosopher thoroughly dedicated to the pursuit 
of  truth  and  completely  separated  from  political  affairs  was  opposed  by  an 
alternative position of the “civic humanism,” according to which it would be unwise 
and unsafe to entrust our lives to others by not assuming an active role in the 
society.25  Hythloday  presents  himself  as  a  defender  of  the  former  position.  He 
regards the court-life as a life of compromise, hypocrisy and lies and opts for the 
freedom of living as he pleases. The sailor introduces the discussion on theft and 
English  laws  by  observing  the  way  men  would  think  their  “whole  reputation 
endangered.” They would look like simpletons if someone advised them by using 
something he had “read of in other ages or seen in practice elsewhere.” The sailor  
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remembers  that  he  had  encountered  such  “proud,  obstinate,  ridiculous 
judgements,”26 once in England. At that time Hythloday tried to expose various 
arguments against the way the English law punishes thieves after allowing the idle 
nobility to rob them of the only chance to survive, either by their enclosures or by 
dismissal of large numbers of idle servants. While his proposal for the diminishing 
of the punishment is taken up by his audience with hostility, he is applauded by the 
same people only after the Cardinal, as one of their important authorities of the day, 
embraces  Hythloday’s  views.27  The  discussion  mentioned  in  Book  One  has  an 
important bearing on the scope of the entire writing. It shows what the following 
Book aims at improving and what the principal cause of all evil that leads to such 
great injustice consists of. The corruption of court life, the poverty of the simple 
people, their despair and the high rate of criminality all are caused by the legal 
indulgence of one “prime plague” and the worst of the human vices: pride.  
  It  seems,  then,  that  More  presents  in  Book  One  an  image  of  a 
malfunctioning commonwealth whose disease consists in the wrong guidance of the 
human nature, which means letting false pleasures, false values and wicked desires 
govern rationality, true virtues and true values. Utopia, by contrast, is presented to be 
a place where there is no poverty, no lack of useful things, no exposition of false 
values like deceiving riches and no injustice caused by uneven distribution of goods. 
Are the Utopians different from all other human beings? Have they been 
blessed  with  higher  qualities  than  other  human  beings?  On  the  contrary,  the 
Utopians  have  not  received  any  religious  revelation,  they  have  not  been 
Christianized and Christian religious learning is anything but familiar to them. Thus, 
they are pagan: “there are different forms of religion not only throughout the island 
but even within their individual cities” although, “the vast majority, and those by far 
the wisest ones. . .believe in a single divinity, unknown, eternal, infinite, inexplicable, 
beyond the grasp of the human mind, and diffused throughout the universe, not 
physically, but by influence.”28 How is it then possible for people who have not 
heard of Christ and of the Christian virtues to offer an example of social order and 
social  interaction?  It  becomes  clear  that  More  is  siding  with  the  tradition  of 
discourse about social idealization that stresses individual moral effort rather than 
the  opposite  device  of  millennial  coup  de  grace.29  But  whether  moral  effort 
represents what we would call a continuous personal struggle with sin that comes 
out of our own acknowledgement of evil still remains to be settled. 
  First we find out that king Utopus who had conquered the Utopians almost 
2000 years earlier had turned the peninsula into an island by cutting the channel that 
bound it with the continent, isolating it from the rest of the world. Isolation, as 
Davis  stresses,  “was  one  recourse  against  fortuna  as  opposed  to  directed  moral 
action,”  “but  watchfulness,  discipline  and  control  was  also  necessary”  in  the 
eliminating the obstacles to the achievement of the ideal society.30 The leveling of 
conditions and options is the first step taken by the wise king in the re-education of 
his people. That’s why he made them build “fifty-four cities entirely identical in  
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language, customs, institutions and laws,”31 identical in what their architecture and 
their construction regards, the insides of which the utopian people exchange every 
ten years and which have “double doors which open easily” and “let anyone come 
in  –  so  there  is  nothing  private  anywhere.”32  Thus,  isolation  represents  the 
prerequisite of instituting a new social order which would sweep away all pride-
nourishing circumstances- especially self-interest. As self-interest stems from private 
property,  the  latter  must be  replaced  by  exclusively  common  possessions  which 
would then put individuals to work for the common good. Thus, private property is 
considered to be the root of all evil and therefore the cause of sin.  
Reviving  Platonic  communism,  More  tries  to  offer  a  solution  to  the 
problem posed by the polarization good citizen/good man rooted in Machiavelli’s 
writings.33  This  is  why  he  overlaps  the  civic  duties  with  the  individual  virtue 
suggesting  that  the  best  form  of  society  is  the  one  consisting  of  citizens 
continuously  preoccupied  with  the  welfare  of  the  public  sphere.  Thus  we  can 
appreciate the specific attention given to their gardens, the cities’ fields and the 
dedication given to their various crafts which prove useful and profitable to all 
inhabitants  of  Utopia.  All  the  activities  of  the  Utopians  seem  oriented  towards 
maximizing the utility, suggesting the rational presupposed nature of the individual. 
The interest for agriculture is one such example. Even the dress code is restricted to 
utility.  
  Because their social life is “well ordered and the commonwealth properly 
established,” the Utopians do not have to worry about any shortage in essential 
things like food. In a commonwealth where every adult complies with the fixed 
working hours, there is no reason to “fear that anyone will claim more than they 
need.” 
 
“Fear of want, no doubt, makes every living creature greedy and rapacious, 
and man, besides, develops these qualities out of sheer pride, which glories 
in getting ahead of others by a superfluous display of possessions. But this 
sort of vice has no place whatever in the Utopian scheme of things.”34  
 
Not because the Utopians have completely discarded their sinful nature, but 
because their institutional setting and legislation are continuously regulating their 
social interaction. Permanent surveillance is a daily fact, although free time is left to 
every  person’s  individual  discretion,  provided  that  free  time  “is  not  wasted  in 
roistering or sloth”35 but used properly for the general improvement of the mind 
and society.  
  The Utopians secure all this virtuous and undisturbed way of living through 
their engagement in promoting the true virtues and pleasures. The Utopians define 
virtue as living according to nature. This might be explained by the fact that More’s 
view of the nature of man had been deeply influenced by that of Giovanni Picco de 
la Mirandola whom he popularized in early sixteenth-century England. For de la  
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Mirandola, man had the potential to become what form of life he desired to be in 
the sense that he could sink to the level of an animal or rise to the heights of a 
god.36 This view on the indeterminate ontological status of man is taken up by More 
and presented as a principle of self-perfection of man through his own rationality 
and his excellent moral capacity. The English humanist transfers upon Utopia the 
“social ideal in which fallible human beings live in a society of moral dignity and 
worth without the aid of revelation and that, moreover such an ideal cannot be 
arrived at only by moral effort in a curial context or even by the legislative effort;”37 
it needs a fierce enforcement of strictly regulated laws. Social morality is rational in 
Utopia;  everything  that serves  the  common  good  is  rational  to  be  pursued  and 
man’s nature seems political, in the Aristotelian sense.  
Moreover, since everyone has a single path to follow and some fixed rules 
to obey, the “state” is a continuous presence that “dogs” its subjects, be it under the 
yoke of control, tight discipline and circumscription of choice. This seems to be the 
only way to fight man’s sinful nature, as one cannot thoroughly escape it. So, even if 
More reinforces the idea of rational freedom, the “cage of humanity” can never be 
escaped. Still, the Utopians are taken to live a much more virtuous live than the 
decadent high-ranked circles of the late middle Ages. Convinced that the highest 
form  of  virtuous  living  is  possible  because  human  beings  are  able  to  obey  the 
dictates of reason, the Utopians manage to live in the manner that Christians do 
without actually being Christians.38 Like the heathens, they live their lives pursuing 
reasonable  pleasure  and  felicity.  In  Epicurean  tradition,  they  distinguish  several 
classes of pleasure and seek primarily, among them those of the mind, prizing them 
most highly.39 
  Still, pride remains “too deeply fixed in human nature to be easily plucked 
out.”40 This is why Utopia had to embody a society endowed with an appropriate 
institutional, legal and educational apparatus to guide flawed men into a proper 
social practice. More striking than the fact that their night pots were made of gold is 
the fact that, as Davis emphasizes “all acts and relationships were subject to control, 
all were public, none private.”41 Utopia swept everything into its totality. And that is 
what Utopia is all about: an ideal image of an organized everything continuously 
subjected to a leviathanic bureaucracy. That’s why Utopia might not be about men’s 
own renewing power at all since it does not help them become better but instead 
eradicates their entire inner structure by inflicting institutional control upon them. 
Imagining all the elements of a society that would contrast thoroughly with his 
contemporary world (communism, heathenism) More offers a highly improbable 
alternative to it. In the end, More himself seems unconvinced of the possibility of 
such  a  thorough  reform  of  thought.  It  seems  that  even  for  him  Utopia  is  too 
utopian. His criticism of the English society and commonwealth is nevertheless 
pointed and acute and Utopia is its most strenuous manifestation. 
  Whereas More seemed to strongly believe in man’s own capacity to “re-
form” one’s moral behavior in an appropriate institutional setting and to determine  
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himself to restrain his actions only to virtuous practice that presumably corrects the 
sinful  nature,  Bacon  is  convinced  that  man’s  moral  capacity  to  regain  the 
prelapsarian condition has been deeply and irremediable compromised by the Fall.  
 
New Atlantis: a programmatic fable  
The problem conducting the following section of this paper tries to give an 
answer to the good question posed by Frank and Fritzie Manuel: “What is Francis 
Bacon doing among the Utopian prophets?”42 The strategy is to present a similar 
answer, by analyzing the text on view of what was said about More’s work. My 
intent is to also argue that the program of the New Atlantis is attainable and worth 
looking at for the naturalists who adopted the ‘New Philosophy of Nature’ that 
Bacon is promoting in his lengthy philosophical writings. Setting it against More’s 
Utopia and the structural elements of the Morean society, it may become clear not 
only that Bacon is criticizing More but also that his aim is quite different. Using 
different accounts from the literature, I will show that Bacon wrote in the form of a 
fable about a model of a knowledge based society. Thus, his account of the perfect 
society is an image of a less than perfect scientific program, whose fruits could be 
appropriately grasped only by people whose morals have been formed in a Christian 
spirit. Although I do not discuss the various religious motifs which are embedded in 
Bacon’s  work,  I  agree  with  Manuels’  assertion  that  “when  the  eighteen-century 
philosophers  abstracted  the  Baconian  method  and  plan  from  his  profoundly 
religious context, they were doing violence to the spirit of the work.”43 
New Atlantis is published after Bacon’s death, at the end of a bulky volume, 
Sylva Sylvarum, which was supposed to embody the third part of Bacon’s ‘Great 
Instauration  of  Knowledge’:  a  collection  of  data,  observations  and  experiments 
which would then be worked upon with the aid of the right method (which had 
thereafter never been actually written).44 William Rawley, Bacon’s chaplain and his 
literary executor added to it the following prefatory note:  
 
This fable my Lord devised, to the end that he might exhibit therein a 
model or description of a college instituted for the interpreting of nature 
and the producing of great and marvelous works for the benefit of men, 
under  the  name  of  Salomon’s  House,  or  the  College  of  the  Six  Days’ 
Works. And even so far his Lordship hath proceeded, as to finish that part . 
. . His Lordship thought also in this present fable to have composed a 
frame  of  Laws,  or  the  best  state  or  mould  of  a  Commonwealth;  but 
foreseeing it would be a long work, his desire of collecting the Natural 
History diverted him, which he preferred many degrees before it.45  
 
We  have  many  reasons  to  believe  that  Bacon  might  have  been  very 
interested in appropriate laws and in improving the nature of the Commonwealth 
not only because he was a controversial figure but also because he was a humanist  
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engaged  in  marrying  ethical  and  civic  activities.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  vita 
contemplativa was embraced by Bacon after his disgrace46 - when he was charged with 
twenty-three separated counts of corruption and was declared incapable of holding 
any other future offices - and the fact that writing natural histories had been his 
principal  focus  after  1621, Bacon  also  wrote  the  History of  the Reign of  Henry  the 
Seventh. This piece of work emphasized Bacon’s conviction that the best government 
would be the one taken up by the learned.47 In The Advancement of Learning, Book I he 
quotes past episodes reminding of the fruitful union of learning and statesmanship: 
 
In this emperor’s time (Marcus Aurelius Antonius) also the church for the 
most  part  was  in  peace’(  Bacon  could  be  hinting  at  the  great  religious 
schism caused by the Reformation but also at the various sects Anglicanism 
had brought forth); ‘so as in the sequence of six princes we do see the 
blessed effects of learning in sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table 
of the world.48 
 
 There is no doubt that Francis Bacon was trying to solve the same conflict 
that preoccupied Thomas More between the contemplative and active nature of a 
man’s  life;  a  conflict  absorbed  from  the  humanist  debate.  Bacon’s  pledge  for 
experimental  philosophy  and  his  continuous  effort  of  bringing  learned  men’s 
understanding  around  seem  to  offer  a  kind  of  solution  to  the  tension.  On  the 
contrary,  More  only  seems  to  augment  the  problem  through  presenting  two 
different positions, Hythloday’s and his own. To Bacon, knowledge is power and 
New Atlantis is precisely a manifestation of this conviction. 
 
New Atlantis – a purifying from within with the aid of faith 
The beginning of Bacon’s fable closely resembles More’s Utopia on several 
aspects:  the  isolated  unknown  island,  the  appeal  to  the  traditional  myth  of  the 
discovery  and  the  invocation  of  Plato’s  myth  Atlantis.  But  this  sets  the  end  to 
similarities, since the first contact which the sailors established with the island’s 
inhabitants  reveals  to  them  the  deep  Christian  allegiance  which  governs  the 
islanders’ attitude and actions, including their behavior towards the strangers.  
The first contact between the European sailors and the people of Bensalem 
is strongly marked by this Christian allegiance:  
 
. . . stood up, and with a loud voice in Spanish asked: Are ye Christians? We 
answered. We were . . .At which answer the said person lifted his right hand 
towards heaven, and drew it softly to his mouth, and then said: If ye swear 
by the merits of the Saviour that ye are no pirates, nor have shed blood 
lawfully  nor  unlawfully  within  forty  days  past,  you  may  have  licence  to 
come on land.49  
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Relieved  by  such  thoroughly  assumed  Christianity,  the  sailors  listen  and 
comply with the advice and guidance received from the islands’ inhabitants. Then, 
they are guided to Bensalem (the island’s name, meaning ‘The Brothers of Peace’) 
and to the Strangers’ House where they are told to stay for three full days to rest and 
recover from the diseases some of the sailors had caught on sea. Three days later, 
the governor visits them willing to speak to six of them and elucidate “who was the 
apostle of that nation, and how it was converted to faith.”50 Then, we are told the 
story  of  the  conversion  of  Bensalem.  The  conversion  to  Christianity  of  the 
Bensalemites was done by direct divine intervention51 about twenty years after the 
Resurrection and Ascension of Christ, a time when the minds of the people were 
still  nourished  by  the  apostolic  tenets  and  not  yet  embroiled  by  error  and 
misinterpretation which occur with the passage of time.52. 
  Marriage  is  a  sacred  institution  and  the  family  has  its  own  ceremony 
dedicated to those men who have over thirty children or grandchildren. Up to now 
it resembles its Morean counterpart. The inhabitants’ mind is pure and uncorrupted 
and allows them to behave virtuously and to closely follow the Christian precepts, a 
virtuous nature that allowed for God’s revelation in the first place, thanks to King 
Solomona53 who isolated his nation and created Solomon’s House to “find out the 
true  nature  of  all  things  (whereby  God  might  have  the  more  glory  in  the 
workmanship of them and men the more fruit in the use of them).”54 This is where 
we  reckon  the  particular  statute  of  the  Bensalemites  in  comparison  to  their 
European tallies. Thus, we know that the virtuous and pious people of Bensalem are 
the more blissful and devoid of worries or pain by having amidst them the “noblest 
foundation that was upon earth and the lanthorn of this kingdom (…) dedicated to 
the study of the Works and Creatures of God.”55 This is how Bacon manages to 
unite knowledge and faith, warning, as a clear reaction against More’s pagan virtuosi, 
that humanity cannot gain the benefits from nature without proper piety. 
The  relation  the  Bensalemites  establish  with  the  search  for  knowledge 
separates the chosen ones from the vulgar and introduces, hence, a social cleavage. 
On the one hand, there are the members of Solomon’s House, whose lives are 
dedicated  to  discoveries  and  innovations,  and  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  the 
people that rejoice over the fruits of the formers’ natural inquiries. In comparison to 
More’s  egalitarian  society,  Bacon  portrays  a  less  fully  integrated  society,  one  in 
which a class of untouchables exists.  
The inhabitants of Bensalem, as a community of virtuous people living in 
peace  and  harmony  completely,  embrace  the  Christian  faith.  Still,  they  are  not 
supposed  to  reach  moral  perfectness,  a  feature  inherent  in  the  nature  of  the 
Utopians. Resting on a mixture of Pelagian and Mirandollian accounts of human 
nature,  More’s  man  is  thoroughly  capable,  provided  that  he  is  surrounded  by 
appropriate institutions to guide his way, of achieving moral perfectness on his own, 
without any help of Revelation,56 On the contrary, the description of the island of 
Bensalem, includes no information about basic characteristics of its inhabitants. We  
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are not told if they act as deeply rational human beings and conduct themselves by 
principles of common-sense or utility as we have seen that the utopians do or what 
kind of legal regulations sanction their behavior. What distinguishes Bensalemites 
from Europeans is their much better moral condition. As Macauley has pointed out, 
the inhabitants of Bensalem behave with chastity and innocence, marriage being 
regarded  as  the  most  sacred  of  all  institutions.  The  text  informs  us  that  the 
Bensalemites value greatly the family values and that they are generally hospitable 
people. They are helped in their tasks by the Fellows of Solomon, whose scientific 
practice eases the lives of the citizens.57  
However, Bacon does not grant the individual the capacity of achieving 
moral faultlessness. The central focus of the following paragraphs will be to argue 
that Bacon considered the Fall to be the result of a moral and not of a cognitive 
decay. Although a distinction is established between those who can achieve insight 
into nature and those that cannot, Bacon does not transform the chosen society of 
scientific fellows into a divine society of angels. Their fallible nature is hinted at in 
the text itself in a passage where the Father of Solomon’s House speaks about the 
House of Deceits. The Fall, as John Channing Briggs insists, was the result in man’s 
moral knowledge, not his capacity to know nature:58  
 
it was not the pure knowledge of nature and universality, a knowledge by 
the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise, as 
they were brought before him, according unto their properties, which gave 
the occasion to the Fall; but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, 
with an intent in man to give law unto himself and to depend no more on 
God’s commandments which was the form of the temptation.59 
 
The  only  chance  left  to  man  in  approaching  God  was  to  decipher  the 
signatures of the divine mind in nature. This is how natural philosophy relates to 
religion - as a subordinate, yet powerfully complementary instrument.60 But we can 
tell that the sinfulness of human nature does not spare the Fellows of the House of 
Six Days either. As Davis correctly observes, there is a laboratory among the many 
Houses dedicated to research in Solomon’s House, called House of Deceits which 
helps the fellows beware of charlatans and conjurers who encroach upon genuine 
science by understanding their tricks: 
 
But  we  do  hate  all  impostures  and  lies,  insomuch  as  we  have  severely 
forbidden it to all our fellows, under pain of ignominy and fines, that they 
do not show any natural work or thing adorned or swelling, but only pure 
as it is, and without all affectation of strangeness.61 
 
Although there are few laws outlined by Bacon and put to work in the 
construction  of  Bensalem’s  internal  functioning  they  are  highly  restrictive.  Such  
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example of restriction is the isolationist character of the island. Another one is the 
fact that the inhabitants, except for a few of them, have travel restrictions.  
The piety of Bensalem’s citizens serves to highlight the disparity between 
Bensalem and the House of Solomon. We are told that the Bensalemites live in 
accordance with the Word of Christ and that they are to remain in the shadow of 
the Brothers because they are not allowed to travel and improve their knowledge, 
but instead have to remain virtuous and faithful. Besides, we know that Bacon’s 
definition of knowledge is power and that, as it was shown power can fall in the 
hands of the “unworthy.” That is why the person of the private citizen of any 
commonwealth seems to be advised by Bacon to remain pious since he cannot 
reach the light of knowledge.  
Secrecy  is  another  aspect underlying the  idea that  knowledge  should  be 
handled with care. As McCauley observes, the secrecy characterizing the work of 
Salomon’s House raises the question of whether the character of the ideal institution 
could still be inferred as there is only meager communication with the simple people 
who are rather held back from the natural knowledge and just enjoy the benefits of 
the fellows’ research. He identifies in the allegiance of secrecy Bacon’s attempt to 
resolve  the  paradox  of  scientific  utopia.62  I  would  only  agree  with  Sargent’s 
suggestion that secrecy appears to be a necessary consequence of any cooperative 
project.63  Inside  the  virtuous  society,  the  members  of Salomon’s House form  a 
powerful  and  privileged  social  class.  From  the  Father  of  Salomon’s  House  the 
chosen sailor finds out that they decide in ‘consultations’ among themselves “which 
of the inventions and experiences which they have discovered should be published 
and which not; and take all an oath of secrecy, for the concealing of those which we 
think fit to keep secret: though some of those we do reveal sometimes to the state, 
and some not.”64  
Bacon does not explain in his fable how the Fellows of Salomon’s House 
had managed to find the appropriate way to do science, as he did not have the 
chance to write an explicit treatise of method. To the following question Bacon gave 
sparse and metaphorical answers: What are the natural philosophers supposed to do 
to gain knowledge? In his Novum Organum Bacon suggests that to enter the path of 
science one has to have the mind resembling children’s minds, whose lack of vanity 
gives them privileged access to the kingdom of heaven.65 It seems that not everyone 
can be a natural philosopher. In Temporis Partus Masculus says:  
 
when  all  the  approaches  and  entrances  to  men’s  minds  are  beset  and 
blocked by the most obscure idols-idols deeply implanted and, as it were 
burned in –that any clean and polished surface remains in the mirror of the 
mind on which the genuine natural light of things can fall? . . . Nor, even if 
you wished to do so, could you rid yourself of idols by simply taking my 
advice  without  familiarizing  yourself  with  nature.  On waxen  tablets  you  
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cannot write anything new until you rub out the old. With the mind it is not 
so; there you cannot rub out the old until you have written in the new.66 
 
Bacon’s  account  of  a  continuously  self-improving  scientific  knowledge, 
which he illustrates in the detailed description of the scientific achievements of the 
naturalists  of  Salomon’s  House,67  dismisses  any  image  of  a  closed  and  perfect 
society whether socio-political or scientific. Perfect human beings do not need any 
progress whatsoever. But that is precisely what continuous inquiry into nature is 
about.  What  is  more,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  deceit  and  counterfeit  can  be 
banished  from  human  minds.68  Nevertheless  a  virtuous  life  -  convenient  to  the 
Christian precepts - and a sustained fight against various preconceptions destined to 
blur the mind can get one nearer to nature and thus to the divine will irrespective of 
the social-political background.  
Contrasting  the  definition  constructed  above  with  the  participation  and 
illustration  of  the  various  elements  in  More’s  Utopia,  the  ethical  and  political 
arrangements of the island, that Bacon imagines, dazzle the reader by their absence. 
As David Colclough righteously recalls,  
 
While in More’s work Hythloday offers a detailed description of Utopia’s 
geography, government and laws, the moral philosophy of the inhabitants 
and  their  domestic  or  economic  arrangements,  and  while  the  island 
narrative of Book II is used as an example of a specific moral and political 
argument (that private property should be abolished), readers of the New 
Atlantis remain ignorant of most of these aspects of Bensalem.69  
 
As I said earlier, it might be the case that Bacon wanted to concentrate on 
the aspect of achieving, maintaining and improving knowledge. In consequence, one 
cannot find in the New Atlantis any explicitly exposed institutional coercion or any 
sort of bureaucratic organization of the social life because they are of no interest to 
Bacon’s central point. It should be clear by now that the New Atlantis does not 
integrate the model of a perfect society as More does. Thus, in this context, David 
Colclough’s  remark  is  a  welcome  conclusion  to  the  problem  of  the  absence  of 
political and ethical concerns in Bacon’s work. Colclough states the following: 
 
The ethical and political ’he says, ‘both in terms of the detailed description 
of  an  ideal  commonwealth  and  of  recommended  codes  of  conduct  are 
absent partly because Bacon is offering a model of the use of knowledge 
and reading for any society (even if most specifically seventeenth-century 
England) rather than a model of a new perfect society.70  
 
To answer the question addressed by Frank and Fritzie Manuel set at the 
beginning of this section, several readers might have interpreted Bacon’s model as a  
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utopia falling into the category of the constructive criticism of the present via an 
ideal  alternative  (future  or  present).71  And  there  is  nothing  erroneous  to  seeing 
Bacon’s work as an attempt to offer an alternative to a flawed system of knowledge 
which  of  course  concerns the  whole  community  who  adopts  it.  What  I  cannot 
accept is the assumption that Bacon’s imagined society represents a static and closed 
state  of  affairs  resembling  perfectness  and  resenting  improvement.  Such  a  view 
would  rob  of  the  work  its  most  important  message  -  the  hope  and  success  of 
attainability of its project - through the Royal Society - that accompanies Bacon’s 
philosophical thinking. 
The  fallen  nature  of  man,  the  irrelevance  of  political  structure  for  the 
Baconian model of scientific community, the elitist paradigm of its formation and 
the secrecy that assures the safety and progress of both science and civic society 
represent the basis for the development of the first scientific circles elaborating the 
new philosophy. Robert Boyle, the apologist of the experimental society and self-
proclaimed follower of Baconian natural philosophy, founding member of the Royal 
Society, adopted a fallibilist conception of man’s natural knowledge72. He adopted 
the Baconian view that the human mind must constantly free itself from deeply 
rooted errors and prejudices to be able to embark on the right path leading to true 
knowledge.  He  also  embraced  the  practice  of  knowledge  dissemination  among 
natural  philosophers.  He  constantly  gathered  only  a  limited  number  of  people 
around him who were supposed to attest to the undertaken of experiments, a fact 
harshly  criticized  by  Hobbes  in  his  “Dialogus  Physicus”  in  the  1660’s.  Boyle 
departed metaphysics from natural philosophy and proclaimed independency of the 
political disputes, while nevertheless hoping that the Royal Society would receive the 
promised funds from its president - King Charles II. Taking the image of the natural 
philosopher as a priest of a Baconian type several steps further, Boyle remained 
profoundly religious, almost at the brink of heresy.73 Taken as a whole, the Royal 
Society may be regarded as resembling the closest to the model offered by its Lord 
Verulam in New Atlantis. In consequence, the Royal Society propagandists miss no 
chance to trumpet about the great Baconian legacy.74 
 
Conclusion 
What  I  did  in  this  paper  was  to  compare  two  major  works  of  the 
renaissance period that marked the history of western thought in order to show that 
although both may contain elements of utopian writing, one is definitely less utopian 
than the other. Since I chose to compare the work that heralded the genre - More’s 
Utopia - to a work that was afterwards considered to be a scientific variant of its kind 
-  Bacon’s  New  Atlantis  -  I decided  to  additionally  mark  out  the  already  existing 
contrast that sets the two literary creations apart. Adopting definitions of utopia and 
utopianism,  indebted  to  More’s  account,  from  the  literature,  I  took  the  most 
important fragments of More’s work apart in order to analyze its overall thesis, and  
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to  highlight  its  essential  features.  Thus,  I  followed  the  story  line  of  Utopia  and 
insisted on the extremely elaborate description of the daily routine of the Utopians. 
I wanted to show that Utopia does embody an unabated criticism of the 
English society of the sixteenth century and more importantly that it embodies an 
ideal  of  societal  order  with  two  distinctive  features:  strict  surveillance  of  man’s 
private life and communitarian economy. At the bottom of the fictional construct 
lies a precise account of human nature - man as a rational being. As a result of man’s 
presupposed rationality, More believes that renewal is possible in the appropriate 
institutional control. The mechanisms of such attempt, like the strict regulation and 
ordering to make the society rational, utilitarian and flawless despite the unalterable 
sinful  nature  of  man  are  striking  features  of  More’s  Utopia.  Nevertheless,  More 
expresses his doubts about the possibility of the implementation of an utopian law 
in a society like his own and fears that the principles of Utopia’s legislation are much 
too improbable to be understood and to be willingly assumed by his European 
contemporaries.  
  In the second part of the paper, I emphasized that Bacon’s attitude towards 
his project seems much more optimistic than More’s doubtful one. Although he 
does not aim at perfecting man’s morals, he redundantly claims that knowledge of 
nature is the only path to truth man is left with. Following the same strategy as in 
More’s case, I deconstructed the text of New Atlantis to see whether totality and 
perfectness are the two essential features of the narrative as In More’s text. I argued 
that New Atlantis depicts a society whose wellbeing is centered on a scientific circle. 
Bacon doesn’t say much neither about social relationships – with few exceptions, 
like  the  patriarchal  structure  of  the  family  and  the  high  esteem  citizens  show 
towards marriage – nor about the political regime or institutional setting of the 
community. I argued that the reason for this is the lack of importance these features 
carry for the scope of Bacon’s text: to outline a scientific programme which was to 
be followed by the new philosophers of nature, who opposed Aristotelianism and 
dogmatism in science. In addition, to support further my claim, I argued that the 
fact that Bacon’s plan was indeed attempted to be taken over by the Royal Society 
stands as proof for the scientific core of New Atlantis.  
  To  recall  one  of  Davis’s  claims,  either  utopia  sets  limits  to  science  or 
science undermines utopia. In this paper, I argue for the latter and I have shown 
that science defined as a constantly evolving practice and discipline is not congruent 
with  definition  of  utopianism.  A  totalitarian  political  system  characterized  by 
systematic political control and constant surveillance of man’s actions renders any 
attempt for new knowledge absurd, as there is nothing to discover in a society 
where everyone knows what’s best and acts accordingly. Thus, Bacon’s claim that 
science  represents  power  partly  challenges  institutional  control:  it  renders  it 
insufficient and, offers it a secondary role in relation to science. Bacon does not 
entirely eradicate the importance of politics, but what New Atlantis emphasizes is  
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thehighly beneficial effect of scientific practice on society in general, regardless of 
political allegiance or ideology. 
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